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Abstract
The application of decentralized reputation systems is a promising approach to ensure
cooperation and fairness, as well as to address random failures and malicious attacks in
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. However, they are potentially vulnerable to liars. With our
work, we provide a first step to analyzing robustness of a reputation system based on a
deviation test. Using a mean-field approach to our stochastic process model, we show that
liars have no impact unless their number exceeds a certain threshold (phase transition).
We give precise formulae for the critical values and thus provide guidelines for an optimal
choice of parameters.
Keywords: Mobile Ad-Hoc Network, reputation system, robustness against liars, mean-
field approach, performance optimization
1 Introduction
The performance of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks is well-known to suffer from free-riding as
there is a natural incentive for nodes to only consume, but not contribute to the services of
the system. Forwarding their peers’ packets, for example, uses up limited battery lifetime
without giving any immediate reward. Users themselves do not need to be technology experts;
it would suffice if a company produced devices that do not cooperate and therefore have a
longer runtime.
Free-riding is a well-known problem in economics and often occurs in situations involving
public goods [12]. That is, goods that are both non-rivalrous (meaning that consumption by
one does not limit consumption by others) and non-exclusive (meaning benefits cannot be
excluded). In Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, nodes free-ride in that they increase their utility by
not shouldering their fair share of the costs.
On the other hand, altruism has been observed. Altruism is the practice of being helpful
to other people with little or no interest in being rewarded for one’s efforts. The concept
has a long history in philosophical and ethical thought. For recent references see [41, 19, 4].
However, we cannot typically rely on altruistic nodes to ensure collaboration in Mobile Ad-
Hoc Networks. Moreover, we would like to protect the network from malicious attacks and
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random failures. In the absence of suitable countermeasures, performance of the network can
dramatically decrease [31, 8, 1].
A solution approach addressing all of these problems is the application of reputation
systems. By reputation we mean an estimate about a nodes’s actual quality in terms of its
behaviour in the network. Sometimes this is also referred to as trust. Nodes keep track
of their peers’ behaviour and exchange this information with others in order to compute a
reputation value about the other nodes. Nodes with a good reputation are then favoured.
For more general articles on reputation systems see [42] and [32]. However, in the context of
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks a reputation system must necessarily be fully decentralized to fit
the architecture and to preserve its advantages such as scalability.
By using second-hand information in addition to own observations, an accurate estimate
of some subject’s (the node under consideration) behaviour can be obtained faster. Moreover,
a node can have a reputation value about a subject without ever having interacted with it
itself. However, an inherent problem with any such mechanism is the vulnerability to liars.
A simple idea to protect the system from liars was suggested by Buchegger and Le Boudec
as part of their CONFIDANT Protocol (Cooperation of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc
NeTworks) [8, 9]. A node believes second-hand information only if it does not differ too
much from the node’s reputation value. This is called the deviation test. In fact, the system
considered in [9] is more complex. It also allows for using second-hand information from
trusted peers, where here trust refers to agreement in the reputation values. Therefore each
node maintains both a reputation and a trust value about each of its peers.
The system appears to work well, although performance has only been evaluated through
simulations of a network with a particular set of assumptions (e.g. on the routing protocol).
Further simulations suggested that the deviation test on its own without the trust component
performs nearly as well. It seems surprising that such a simple idea works so well and we
consider it worth analyzing in more detail and in a more general context. This is the aim of
our research.
We thus consider an abstract model of a reputation system based on the deviation test. We
are primarily concerned with the formation of reputation rather than with the detection and
response components of a reputation system. The detection component depends on the given
Mobile Ad-Hoc Network. For example, most reputation systems suggested for Mobile Ad-
Hoc Networks have been assuming Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [24] and have based the
detection component on its properties. In contrast, we merely assume that bad behaviour can
be told apart from good behaviour. We also assume that if reputation values can be computed
accurately, than there exists a response mechanism using them to obtain the desired effects.
Typically, this might mean exclusion of benefits for the misbehaving node.
In an earlier paper [39] we dealt with a simplified one-dimensional model. We now consider
the original two-dimensional system. This paper is an extended version of the conference paper
[38]. Whereas in the one-dimensional model there is only a notion of good and bad reputation,
in the two-dimensional model there is an additional notion of the degree of certainty about
the reputation. We analyze the case of 2 nodes, one honest and the other a liar. Our new
results confirm the results of the simplified one-dimensional model.
Our model is also relevant in the context of social networks. If a person in the network
is confronted with information that is not verifiable, they will probably believe it only if, to
them, it seems likely. However, they will ignore it if, to them, it seems unlikely. Work in this
context can be found in [40].
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The methodology we have developed for this problem is a follows. We first formulate
a stochastic process that models the system based on certain assumptions. We then derive
the ‘mean’ ordinary differential equation (ODE) by averaging the dynamics and passing to
a fast-time scaling limit. We solve the ODE and study its fixed points. Our approach is
thus a mean-field approach. Full details are given in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, we verify the
analytical results by means of simulation.
We find that there is a phase transition. That is, there is a threshold proportion of lying
below which the lying has no impact. Above it, the lying does have an impact and corrupts
the reputation system. We give precise formulae and quantify the impact, thereby providing a
performance evaluation of a reputation system based on the deviation test. Alternatively, this
phase transition can be phrased in terms of the system parameter controlling the deviation
test. We thus provide guidelines for a good choice of parameters and hence a good system
design.
This paper is organized as follows. We present related work in Section 2. The precise
modelling assumptions are listed in Section 3 and the stochastic process model is formulated
in Section 4. We give details of our methodology and provide mean-field results in Section 5
and verify them by means of simulation in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Related Work
A number of reputation mechanisms have been suggested and studied. A comprehensive
survey and more detailed overview of reputation systems for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks can be
found in [10]. Reputation systems are classified according to (1) representation of information
and classification, (2) use of second-hand information, (3) trust and (4) redemption and
secondary response.
In addition to the CONFIDANT protocol already discussed in the introduction, the COl-
laborative REputation mechanism (CORE) was introduced in [34]. Here, reputation also
takes into account a task-specific functional reputation. OCEAN [7] and SORI [23] are also
discussed in more detail in the survey. These systems have all been developed for a fairly
specific set of assumptions, in particular assuming Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [24].
Reputation systems have also been considered in other scenarios, in particular Internet-
based Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. Aberer and Despotovic [2] suggest a mechanism for P-
Grid, a P2P system, that spreads negative information only. Collaboration enforcement in
P2P systems has also been considered by Moreton and Twigg [37]. Another mechanism is
PeerTrust as introduced by [48]. The reader is referred to [25] for the EigenTrust algorithm, a
method to compute global trust values in the presence of pre-trusted peers. Another mecha-
nism is PeerTrust as introduced by [48]. A comprehensive survey and more detailed overview
of reputation systems for Internet-based P2P systems can be found in [3]. Another review
with a focus on the artificial intelligence literature is given in [43].
Our work is the first analytical approach to evaluate robustness against liars. [50] consider
the problem of liars via some models of deception. Their approach is based on the weighted
majority technique where the last second-hand information is tested by comparing it to the
next direct interaction. The analysis is based only on simulation. [47] is also concerned
with filtering out manipulated second-hand information that seems unlikely. However, they
consider quantiles of the Beta distribution rather than distance. This paper, too, is based
merely on simulation. In the context of centralized reputation systems, [35] consider incentive
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mechanisms not in order to stimulate good behaviour in the network, but to stimulate honest
reports within the reputation system. They show that honest reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
Alternatives to reputation systems have also been considered, e.g. incentive mechanisms.
They make it advantageous for nodes to act in such a way that the resulting social welfare
is optimal (e.g., [6]). In general, this can either be achieved by means of pricing schemes
[13] or rules [5]. As for pricing schemes, they might involve payments in kind, or virtual or
real payments. For example, a virtual currency called nugglets is suggested in [11] and a
pricing scheme based on notional credit is used in [15], both in the context of Mobile Ad-
Hoc Networks. In [22], the authors examine a micro-payment mechanism for P2P file sharing
networks. A simple example of a rule is to force nodes to contribute in order to consume. Rules
are used in [14] in the context of P2PWireless LAN Consortia. Incentive mechanisms typically
give rise to game-theoretic problems. Unlike reputation systems, incentive mechanisms do not
address malicious nodes and random failures.
A more recent alternative to reputation systems is artificial immune systems. They are
aimed primarily at misbehaviour detection and designed so that they adapt to normal be-
haviour, but they also recognize new misbehaviour patterns that were not anticipated in the
system design phase [45]. Moreover, artificial immune systems use mechanisms for faster
detection of repeated misbehaviour [28] and [44]. An important potential advantage of such
systems is their inherent randomness that provides diversity at the population level. Even if
some computers are vulnerable to an attack, there should be many others that are resistant
to the same attack. However, implementations seem to depend very much on the particular
application and at the moment there is no scenario in which artificial immune system have
proven superior to other approaches.
All three approaches – incentive mechanisms, reputation systems and artificial immune
systems – need to take into account both the economic side and the engineering side. For
example, identity is an issue in all these systems. For more information, the reader is referred
to [21, 18].
3 Assumptions
3.1 Subject Behaviour
We consider the case when there is a single subject whose reputation is considered. This
subject might be one of the N nodes themselves, but it might also be the provider of some
external service such as Internet access. At each observation, its actual behaviour is assumed
to be either positive or negative with probabilities θ and 1− θ respectively, independently of
all other observations. The more practical case when there are M subjects of interest can be
decomposed into M instances of our model, as the M different sets of reputation values do
not interfere with each other. In particular, this allows all nodes to be subjects themselves,
as is the case in a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network.
3.2 Reputation
Each node i maintains a reputation value Ri = Rin about the subject that reflects its belief
about θ at the time of the nth interaction. The initial value is Ri0. Reputation values are
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based on two counters, as will be explained in Section 4. This opinion might change with new
observations, arising either from interactions with the subject itself or with a peer.
A direct (first hand) observation is an observation of the subject’s behaviour. Direct
observations are always accepted and the reputation values updated accordingly. An indirect
(second-hand) observation arises from interactions with peers who report about their own
observations. Indirect observations are only accepted if the reported observation does not
deviate too far from the current reputation Rin. This deviation test is controlled by the
parameter d. Moreover, if accepted, the impact of an indirect observation is scaled by a
weighting parameter ω. Finally, we account for discount factor u so that the system gradually
forgets about old observations. This also allows for tracking subject behaviour that changes.
We shall restrict attention to the case of 2 nodes, an honest one with reputation value Rn
about the subject and the other a liar. This is closely related to the general case, because
several liars can be thought of as a single liar by aggregating their influence and because we
can focus on one out of the honest nodes by symmetry. Furthermore, it looks like ignoring the
other honest ones can be accounted for by increasing the proportion of (necessarily truthful)
direct interactions, but this will have to be investigated in more detail (cf. Section 7).
3.3 Interaction Model
In the general case, the nodes make observations when interacting with the subject or with
a peer. Interactions depend on the topology of the network and the mobility model for the
nodes. We take a high-level view and directly specify the interactions rather than topology
and mobility. More specifically, we assume that interactions occur at certain points Tn in
time and that a given resulting observation is direct or indirect with fixed probabilities p and
p¯ = 1 − p respectively. As a natural model, let the Tn be the points of a Poisson process
and consecutive interactions be independent. Without loss of generality we take the Poisson
process to have rate 1, otherwise we can scale time suitably. Whereas for a given Mobile
Ad-Hoc Network the values of p and p¯ are determined by topology and mobility, we examine
the whole range of parameters p = 1− p¯ ∈ [0, 1]. p large accounts for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
where direct observations are frequent, p small accounts for networks where they are rare.
For ease of notation, we shall often refer to the number of the observation n rather than
its point in time Tn.
Finally, note that in the case of 2 nodes with one honest node and one liar, the honest
node’s second-hand information is necessarily from its lying peer.
3.4 Adversary Model
One needs to make precise assumptions about the adversaries’ abilities in order to give per-
formance guarantees. We assume that liars follow the plain strategy to always lie maximally,
i.e. they will always report either extremely negative or extremely positive behaviour about
the subject when interacting with their peers in an attempt to achieve maximal impact. It
suffices to focus on the extremely negative part, as the other one is similar by symmetry.
3.5 Performance
Notice that liars can easily change their own reputation values to anything they want. The
question is whether they can influence the reputation values of the honest nodes.
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The faster the nodes can obtain accurate estimates of the subject behaviour, the better the
system will work, but there is a fundamental trade-off between speed and robustness. By using
more second-hand information, an estimate of the subject’s behaviour can be obtained faster
– a node can even have a reputation value about a subject without ever having interacted
with it itself; however, it is then more sensitive to potentially wrong information and one
needs to compromise on accuracy.
We assess robustness in detail. It will then be possible, for example, to choose parameters
such that the system will be as fast as possible, subject to a given accuracy condition. In
fact, we show that by using a reputation system based on the deviation test, to some extent
it is possible to gain in terms of speed without compromising on accuracy.
4 Model
We first formulate a stochastic process that models the systems based on the assumptions
of the previous section. A natural scheme, suggested by the reputation system in [9] and
other proposals, is to keep a history of previous events. Two counters, αn and βn, are
updated whenever there is a new observation, either direct or indirect. αn keeps track of
positive observations, βn keeps track of negative observations. Thus we are led to consider
the following two-dimensional stochastic process (αn, βn) for n ≥ 0.
(αn+1, βn+1) = u(αn, βn) +


(1, 0) w.p. pθ
(0, 1) w.p. p(1− θ)
(0, ω)1
{
αn
αn+βn
≤ d
}
w.p. p¯
(1)
The three possibilities correspond to a positive direct observation, a negative direct observa-
tion and an indirect observation respectively (cf. Sections 3.1 and 3.3). Direct observations
are always accepted and counted with 1. Indirect observations have to pass the deviation test
with parameter 0 < d < 1, modelled by the indicator function, and are weighted by ω > 0 as
described in Section 3.2. Indirect observations are negative, because they are obtained from
the liar who is assumed to report extremely negative behaviour (cf. Section 3.4). In any case,
both components are discounted individually by 0 < u < 1 (cf. Section 3.2). Typically, u is
close to 1.
The stochastic process (1) is a homogeneous Markov Chain with the state space being
a subset of the triangular area {(α, β) : max{1, ω}α + β ≤ max{1, ω}/(1 − u)} in the first
quadrant. This is illustrated in Figure 1. For the parameters chosen to be rational, the process
will take rational values only and the state space is easily seen to be countable, although not
easy to describe.
The important quantity of interest is Rn = αn/(αn + βn), in some sense the proportion
of positive observations. We examine how well this compares to the true subject behaviour
θ. In addition, in this two-dimensional model, there is the notion of the degree of certainty
about reputation values, determined by αn + βn. The larger this sum, the more certain the
node is of its reputation value, the more ‘locked in’ the state. Lines of constant reputation,
as well as constant certainty, are also shown in Figure 1.
The initial values are (α0, β0). Note that if ω = 1 and the deviation test is passed, then
starting with α0 + β0 = 1/(1 − u) will leave αn + βn unchanged; starting elsewhere the sum
will converge to 1/(1 − u). It makes sense to start with such a converged value, because we
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αβ
1
1−u
max{1,ω}
1−u
Figure 1: The state space of the stochastic process (1) is a subset of the triangular
area. Dashed lines show points of constant reputation, increasing from bottom to
top. Dotted lines show points of constant certainty, increasing from left to right.
would like to allow for tracking behaviour that changes. However, there can be no a priori
knowledge of a change, so we cannot simply reset the system to an arbitrary starting value.
On the other hand, as the fixed points are not known in advance, we cannot generally choose
initial values to correspond to them. We still take initial values satisfying α0+β0 = 1/(1−u)
as this choice can be viewed as an extreme case. Moreover, we shall see in Sections 5 and 6
that, the choice of initial value does not influence the process in the long run. If we observe
the process settling down at a fixed point starting from such an initial state, then it will also
do so from a less ‘locked in’ state with the same reputation value. By the initial state R0 we
shall mean 11−u(R0, 1−R0). Notation is summarized in Table 1.
symbol meaning
θ prob. of positive subject behaviour (cf. Section 3.1)
p prob. of an obs. being direct (cf. Section 3.3)
p¯ prob. of an obs. being indirect (cf. Section 3.3)
αn positive reputation component (cf. Section 4)
βn negative reputation component (cf. Section 4)
R0 initial reputation value (cf. Sections 3.2, 4)
Rn inferred reputation value (cf. Sections 3.2, 4)
d deviation test parameter (cf. Section 3.2)
ω weighting factor for indirect obs. (cf. Section 3.2)
u discount factor (cf. Section 4)
Table 1: Summary of notation
Note that, although we have defined the process in order to estimate θ, it does not converge
to a constant (in probability). For all n, there is positive probability of the next state taking
either one of two values that differ by a constant. This is due to the discounting. So, we assess
convergence (in distribution) to some limiting distribution from which we infer θ. We will
point out another advantage of the discounting in the reputation system that is essentially
due this convergence in distribution.
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5 Mean-field Approach
Our methodology is as follows. From the stochastic process formulation (1), we derive the
‘mean’ ordinary differential equation (ODE) by averaging the dynamics and passing to a
fast-time scaling limit. That is, we scale time so that events occur more frequently, that is
the honest node makes direct and indirect observations at a higher rate. At the same time,
the impact of each observation is reduced by the same factor. A similar approach has also
been used in TCP modelling (cf. [36] and [30]). One possibility to turn this type of argument
into a rigourous formal limit statement is the fluid limit in [16]. We then derive the solutions
of the differential equation and study its fixed points. We confirm the analytical results by
means of simulation. This is the topic of the next section.
Thus, our approach can be called a mean-field approach. This term has different inter-
pretations in different research communities. In [49], it refers to making an independence
assumption for one side of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. The mean-field idea was
first introduced in physics and has been used to describe systems like plasma and dense gases
where interaction between particles is somewhat weak, meaning that the strength of the in-
teraction is inversely proportional to the size of the system. A given particle is seen as under a
collective force generated by the other particles. In recent years, the mean-field approach has
also found an appeal in the area of communication networks. To name but a few of the many
publications, the reader is referred to [27], [46], [26] and [17]. The stochastic approximation
framework by [29] is also a mean-field approach. The basic paradigm is a stochastic difference
equation where one recursively adjusts the parameter so that some goal is met asymptoti-
cally. The main concept used is to show that noise effects average out so that the process is
determined by a mean ODE. This has been applied in diverse areas, in particular in signal
processing and communications.
The mean-field approach is very powerful in that it enables us to study a complex system
analytically without losing the important features. As we shall see, the phase transition, as
well as the fixed points and critical parameter values, is predicted accurately. What it cannot
do, however, is to compare two simultaneous fixed points in terms of their attraction. It does
not keep all the information contained in the stochastic process. For this, we would need to
investigate a diffusion approximation approach as in [20]. We will gain some insight into this
question via the simulations.
Specifically, we consider a family of processes indexed by N . We will now make the
notation explicit again to stress that the subscripts n are the points Tn of a Poisson process
at rate 1.
(αNTn+1/N , β
N
Tn+1/N
) = (1−
1− u
N
)(αNTn/N , β
N
Tn/N
)
+
1
N


(1, 0) w.p. pθ
(0, 1) w.p. p(1− θ)
(0, ω)1
{
αNTn/N/(α
N
Tn/N
+ βNTn/N ) ≤ d
}
w.p. p¯
(2)
Next, we consider a continuous-time rescaled version. The number of jumps of the process
indexed by N in the interval [t, t+ ǫ) is Poisson(Nǫ), the average jump is of size
−1−uN α
N
t +
1
N [pθ]
−1−uN β
N
t +
1
N
[
p(1− θ) + p¯ω1
{
αN
t
αN
t
+βN
t
≤ d
}] (3)
8
We obtain
αN (t+ ǫ)− αN (t) = NǫN [(u− 1)α(t) + pθ]
βN (t+ ǫ)− βN (t) = NǫN
[
(u− 1)β(t) + p(1− θ) + ωp¯1
{
α
α+β ≤ d
}] (4)
Dividing by ǫ and taking the limit, we are thus led to consider the following deterministic
ODE.
α˙(t) = (u− 1)α(t) + pθ
β˙(t) = (u− 1)β(t) + p(1− θ) + ωp¯1
{
α
α+β ≤ d
} (5)
This system is discontinuous, but linear above and below the line of discontinuity α/(α+β) =
d. Above it, for α/(α + β) > d, we obtain
α(t) = c1 e
−(1−u)t + 11−upθ
β(t) = c2 e
−(1−u)t + 11−up(1− θ)
(6)
for constants c1, c2 whereas below it, for α/(α + β) ≤ d, we obtain
α(t) = c3 e
−(1−u)t + 11−upθ
β(t) = c4 e
−(1−u)t + 11−u [p(1− θ) + ωp¯]
(7)
for constants c3, c4. Fixing the initial reputation counter at (α0, β0) we obtain the constants
and hence the solutions. We find that the system has either one or two fixed points, depending
on the parameters of the model.
(α, β) =
p
1− u
(θ, 1− θ) (8)
is a fixed point is a fixed point if θ > d. If it exists, it is asymptotically stable and trajectories
from α/(α + β) > d are attracted to it. The corresponding reputation value is θ.
(α, β) =
(
pθ
1− u
,
p(1− θ)
1− u
+
ωp¯
1− u
)
(9)
is a fixed point if θ ≤ d or p¯ ≥ (θ − d)/(θ − d + ωd). If it exists, it is asymptotically stable
and trajectories from α/(α + β) ≤ d are attracted to it. The corresponding reputation value
is π = θp/(p + ωp¯). If only one of the two fixed points exists then the trajectories from the
other region lead into its region and thus are also attracted to it. That is all trajectories are
attracted to it. Otherwise, both are asymptotically stable on their respective region. Hence,
we have the following result.
Theorem 1 If θ > d, (8) is a fixed point of the mean ODE (5). For p¯ < p¯c = (θ − d)/(θ −
d + ωd) it is asymptotically stable and all trajectories are attracted to it. The corresponding
reputation value is the true θ. Otherwise, there is a second, false fixed point (9) and both are
asymptotically stable, attracting trajectories from α/(α+β) > d and α/(α+β) ≤ d respectively.
If θ ≤ d then only the latter, false one is asymptotically stable and all trajectories are attracted
to it. The corresponding reputation value is π = (pθ)/(p+ ωp¯).
Thus, the reputation system exhibits a phase transition. Assuming θ > d, we find a bifurcation
in terms of the parameter p¯. In the subcritical regime, that is, for p¯ < p¯c, the fixed point
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corresponding to the true θ is unique. In the supercritical regime where p¯ ≥ p¯c there is a
second, false fixed point.
In practical terms, this suggests that the reputation system works and that the liar cannot
achieve anything if θ > d and p¯ < p¯c. However, the liar does have an impact otherwise. As
for the latter condition, it is intuitively clear that the deviation test can filter out extreme
lies only if they do not occur too often. As for the first condition, it is clear that if the true θ
is too close to the extreme 0 behaviour, the deviation test will not filter the lies and the liar
will have an impact. The deviation test cannot protect a ‘very bad’ subject behaviour to be
pushed by the liar to an ‘extremely bad’ perception by the honest node. However, there is a
range of parameters for which it does protect the reputation system.
As mentioned in Section 3, we can repeat the analysis to show that the reputation system
similarly protects against extremely positive reports. Combining the two, we obtain the
following necessary and sufficient conditions for the true fixed point to be unique when both,
positive and negative lying are permitted: min{θ, 1 − θ} > d and p¯ < (min{θ, 1 − θ} −
d)/(min{θ, 1− θ} − d+ ωd).
Alternatively, the phase transition can be phrased in terms of the system parameter d.
For small d there is only one fixed point, the true one (8). For intermediate d, there are both
the true and the false fixed points and for large d there is only the false fixed point (9). The
exact conditions are given in Corollary 1 and an illustration is provided in Figure 2.
Corollary 1 If d < dc1 = π = (pθ)/(p + ωp¯), (8) is the unique fixed point of the mean ODE
(5). It is asymptotically stable and all trajectories are attracted to it. The corresponding
reputation value is the true theta. If dc1 ≤ d < dc2 = θ there is a second, false fixed
point (9). Both are asymptotically stable, attracting trajectories from α/(α + β) > d and
α/(α + β) ≤ d respectively. If dc2 ≤ d, then only the latter, false one is asymptotically stable
and all trajectories are attracted to it. The corresponding reputation value is π = (pθ)/(p+ωp¯).
θ
θ
π
π 1 d
Existing fixed point
reputation values
Figure 2: Bifurcation plot showing the existence of fixed points for each d: As d
increases from 0 to 1 (from left to right along the horizontal axis), the number of
fixed points changes from 1 (the true fixed point at reputation value θ) to 2 (the
true fixed point at θ and the false fixed point at π) and back to 1 (the false fixed
point at π).
In practical terms, this suggests that the reputation system works as long as d is sufficiently
small. It might not work otherwise, however, and if d is sufficiently large it will not work at
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all. Although this qualitative inverse dependence between d and robustness against liars is
entirely as one would expect, the exact dependence might seem surprising. It can be exploited
for system optimization as follows. If we are interested in a system that is as fast a possible
subject to being accurate, we would choose d just below the first critical value π. Then this is
the largest value of d for which the true θ is still the unique fixed point reputation value. As
such it allows for maximal gain in terms of speed using second-hand information while still
being accurate. This will protect the reputation systems from liars for a reasonable range
of parameters. Given a more general cost function with arbitrary weights on accuracy and
speed, we could again compute the optimal choice of the system parameter d. Thus, we
provide guidelines for a good choice of parameters and hence system design.
6 Simulations
In this section we report our simulation results. We used formulation (1) to compute 105 steps
and then plot Rn = αn/(αn + βn) against n. The program code was written in Java (Version
1.4.1). We used both the standard Java random number generator and the Mersenne Twister
(MT19937) [33] to generate pseudo-random numbers. The lower and upper boundaries in the
graphs correspond to reputation values 0 and 1 respectively. The lower and upper interme-
diate lines correspond to the possible fixed point reputation values π = (pθ)/(p + ωp¯) and θ
respectively. 100 independent runs were carried out in each case and a typical sample path
is shown. We consider the following set of parameters and variations thereof.
Parameter set 1 θ = 0.8, d = 0.4, u = 0.99 and ω = 1 for various values of p and
p¯ = 1 − p. We used both the extreme initial values R0 = 0 and R0 = 1. Thus, from the
previous section, the predicted possible fixed point reputation values are 0.8 and 0.8p. The
critical lying probability is p¯c = pc = 0.5.
In Figure 3 we show a typical sample path for parameter set 1 with p¯ = 0.2, i.e. p = 0.8,
and R0 = 0. We note that Rn increases from 0 past π to θ and then remains within its
neighbourhood until the end of the simulation. All 100 independent runs showed the same
qualitative sample paths. As p¯ = 0.2 < p¯c, this is a subcritical scenario. As expected, θ is
confirmed as the unique fixed point reputation value. Indeed, we obtained the same results
when p¯ = 0.2 is replaced by p¯ = 0.4 and p¯ = 0.45 < p¯c. Here, starting with R0 = 0 can be
viewed as a worst case. For other starting values, too, including the other extreme R0 = 1,
we obtained the same qualitative results.
In Figure 4 we illustrate the effect of the discount parameter u. A typical sample path is
shown for parameter set 1 except u = 0.999. The variability around θ is smaller and it takes
longer for the process to approach θ.
In Figure 5 we consider the supercritical case with now p¯ = 0.8. Also, unlike in parameter
set 1, we take u = 0.95 for clearer illustration. As a side effect, variability is increased.
Increasing from 0, Rn settles down for some time in the neighbourhoods of π = (pθ)/(p+ωp¯) =
0.16 and θ = 0.8 in an alternating fashion. This is in agreement with the mean-field prediction
that both π and θ are fixed point reputation values. It is due to the discounting that we do not
have convergence to a constant, but there is always a positive probability of moving from one
fixed point to the other. This can be viewed as another advantage of discounting, because
the process cannot get stuck at the false fixed point forever. The same qualitative results
are observed in all 100 independent runs and also for p¯ = 0.6 and p¯ = 0.55 > p¯c, only the
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1
θ
π
105 n
Figure 3: 105 steps of a typical sample path for parameter set 1 with p¯ = 0.2 and
R0 = 0. We plot Rn against n, the upper line corresponding to θ and the lower
line to π = (pθ)/(p + ωp¯) (cf. Figure 2). Rn increases from 0 past π to θ and then
remains close to θ. Thus, θ is confirmed as the unique fixed point reputation
value as expected from the analytical results.
Rn
1
θ
π
105 n
Figure 4: 105 steps of a typical sample path for the same parameters as in Figure
3 except u = 0.999. The variability is smaller and it takes longer for the process
to approach θ.
proportion of time spent near θ is higher. Note also that the false fixed point reputation value
depends on p¯ and ω: π = 0.32 and π = 0.36 respectively.
In Figure 6 we demonstrate that the starting value R0 does not influence the process in
the long run. Whereas for the solution of the ODE each fixed point has a basin of attraction
(Theorem 1), there is always positive probability for the stochastic process (1) to move from
one to the other, so the independence of the starting value is as expected.
With a different choice of parameters, the prediction of only one fixed point at π =
(pθ)/(p+ωp¯) for the case θ ≤ d can also be verified. Finally, we carried out simulations with
the same parameters as in Figure 3 except ω = 2 to verify, in particular, the critical value
p¯c = 1/3.
Thus, we have verified the results of the mean-field approach in Section 5. In addition,
Figures 3 – 6 give us an idea of the proportion of time near the false π = (pθ)/(p+ωp¯). This
time increases with p¯.
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Figure 5: 105 steps of a typical sample path for parameter set 1 except u = 0.95
with p¯ = 0.8 and R0 = 0. Rn increases from 0 to π and then settles down for some
time in a neighbourhood of π = (pθ)/(p+ ωp¯) and θ in an alternating fashion.
Rn
1
θ
π
105 n
Figure 6: 105 steps of a typical sample path for the same parameters as in Figure
5 except R0 = 1. Rn decreases from 1 to θ and then settles down for some time in
a neighbourhood of π = (pθ)/(p+ωp¯) and θ in an alternating fashion as before (cf.
Figure 5). Thus, the starting value R0 does not influence the process in the long
run.
7 Conclusions and Further Work
The use of decentralized reputation systems is a promising approach to addressing free-riding,
as well as random failures and malicious attacks, in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. In this paper,
we analyze a reputation system based on the deviation test independently of specific imple-
mentation assumptions. We consider the case of 2 nodes, one honest and the other a liar.
Our results confirm the results obtained for the simplified one-dimensional model addressed
in [39].
In regards to the use of second-hand information, there is a fundamental trade-off be-
tween speed and robustness. By using second-hand information, an estimate of the subject’s
behaviour can be obtained faster – a node can even have a reputation value about a subject
without ever having interacted with it itself; however, it is then subject to potentially wrong
information and one needs to compromise on accuracy. The reputation system based on the
deviation test resolves this issue to a certain degree. There is a phase transition in that there
is a threshold proportion of lying below which the reputation value of the honest node remains
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unaffected. Above it, the lying will have an impact and corrupt the reputation system. We
give precise formulae and quantify the impact, thereby providing a performance evaluation
of the reputation system.
Alternatively, this phase transition can be phrased in terms of the system parameter d
controlling the deviation test. We thus provide guidelines for a good choice of parameters
and hence system design. For example, for a system that is as fast a possible subject to being
accurate, we would choose d just below the first critical value dc1 = π. The deviation test
then protects the reputation systems from liars for a reasonable range of parameters.
We have illustrated another fundamental trade-off in terms of the discount parameter.
The closer it is to 1, the more accurate the process can estimate the parameter. However, it
takes longer to track changing subject behaviour. It is also due to the discount parameter
that we do not have convergence to a constant, but there is always a positive probability of
moving from one fixed point to another. This can be viewed as another advantage, because
the process cannot get stuck at the false fixed point forever.
We have not yet looked in detail at the rate of convergence. Independent runs of the
same simulation showed about the same rate of convergence most of the time. We could
compare this to the exponential decay terms in the mean ODE and thereby check whether
the analytical results are also correct in this respect.
The mean-field approach turned out to be powerful, as well as tractable. We obtained
the fixed points as well as the critical points. It cannot, however, compare two simultaneous
fixed points in terms of their attraction. For this, we would need to investigate a diffusion
approximation approach. Still, even here we gained insight by looking at the time spent near
each of the fixed points in the simulation.
The scenario of two nodes that we have considered thus far can also be viewed as an
extreme case. Even if all other nodes are malicious so that all second hand information is
manipulated, the reputation system protects against the lying in the subcritical regime. In a
real-world scenario we would typically be able to assume that at least some if not most nodes
in the network are honest, thus indirect observations from honest peers should be considered
explicitly.
We have assumed independent subject behaviour. It might be interesting to consider the
case when direct observations are correlated.
Another extension is then to consider strategic lying, that is adversaries attempting some-
thing more subtle than simply lie maximally. The latter assumption makes it easier to filter
out lies with a simple mechanism such as the deviation test, because they are more easily dis-
covered. For example, they could lie in some proportion of reports only or they could always
report intermediate behaviour in an attempt to conceal their lies. In this case, as a counter
measure, one might also want to think about individually controlled di, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , based
on the nodes’ current information. It would also be interesting to consider random noise
instead of fake reports.
Finally, it would be of interest to consider a different interaction model, in particular one
with a non-homogeneous population of nodes. There might even be some nodes that never
interact with the subject directly.
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